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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Faron Raymond Hawkins appeals from the judgment of conviction entered 
upon the jury verdict finding him guilty of two counts of robbery. 
Statement of Facts 
On December 15, 2005, Hawkins called retired FBI agent George Calley 
at home. (Tr., p.521, L.24 - p.524, L.4.) After exchanging pleasantries,' 
Hawkins told Mr. Calley that his (Hawkins') sons were incarcerated in Colorado 
for bank robbery, and he expressed concern for their safety. (Tr., p.524, L.5 - 
p.525, L.25, p.527, L.15 - p.528, L.6.) Hawkins sought Mr. Calley's assistance 
in protecting his sons and also expressed an interest in working for the FBI. (Tr., 
p.527, L.21 - p.528, L.6, p.529, Ls.14-19.) Mr. Calley advised Hawkins that he 
could not personally protect Hawkins' sons, but he offered to put Hawkins in 
touch with the FBI agent in charge of the Boise office. (Tr., p.528, L.7 - p.529, 
L.3.) Hawkins gave Mr. Calley his phone number and email address and the 
conversation ended. (Tr., p.529, Ls.4-9.) 
The next day, Hawkins robbed a Key Bank in Boise. (Tr., p.553, L . l  - 
p.562, L.9, p.572, L.22 - p.573, L.9, p.914, Ls.2-10.) He walked up to the 
service counter and showed the teller a note in which he demanded $15,000.00 
and threatened to "shoot people" if his demands were not met or if anyone tried 
to follow him. (Tr., p.555, L.23 - p.558, L.25; State's Exhibit 8.) The teller 
' Mr. Calley had previously become acquainted with Hawkins during Mr. Calley's 
career as an FBI agent. (Tr., p.523, Ls.12-23.) 
complied with Hawkins' demands and Hawkins left the bank with the money. 
(Tr., p.559, L . l  - p.562, L.9.) The teller subsequently identified Hawkins in a 
photographic line-up, but police were unable to locate him. (Tr., p.568, L.14 - 
p.572, L.21; State's Exhibits 6 and 7.) 
After hearing and seeing news reports of the bank robbery on December 
16th, Mr. Calley suspected Hawkins was the perpetrator. (Tr., p.530, L.8 - 
p.531, L.8.) He contacted law enforcement to advise them of his conversation 
with Hawkins. (Tr., p.531, L.2 - p.532, L.2.) He also attempted to contact 
Hawkins directly at both the phone number and email address Hawkins had 
given him, but Hawkins did not return Mr. Calley's phone calls or emails. (Tr., 
p.532, L.15 - p.533, L.1.) However, three days later, on December 19, 2005, 
Hawkins left a message on Mr. Calley's answering machine. (Tr., p.532, Ls.3- 
14.) In the message, Hawkins "essentially [said] that since he hadn't heard from 
[Mr. Calley], he assumed that [Mr. Calley] [wasn't] going to be able to help him." 
(Tr., p.532, Ls.11-14.) 
Several months passed, and Mr. Calley did not hear from Hawkins. (Jr., 
p.533, Ls.7-10.) On June 6, 2006, Hawkins committed another bank robbery in 
Boise, this time at a Washington Mutual. (Tr., p.587, L.7 - p.592, L.lO, p.601, 
L.9 - p.603, L.6, p.615, Ls.11-17, p.631, L.11 - p.635, L . l l ,  p.916, Ls.4-8.) 
Hawkins committed the robbery in much the same manner as he had the Key 
Bank robbery, i.e. presenting a note demanding $15,000.00 and threatening to 
"shoot people." (Tr., p.606, Ls.19-25, p.622, L.19 - p.623, L.23, p.633, Ls.5-14; 
State's Exhibit 8.) As he was leaving with the money, however, Hawkins turned 
to the tellers and said, "By the way, my name is Faron Hawkins, and this is all 
because of George Calley." (Tr., p.602, Ls.7-10, p.635, Ls.6-11.) Hawkins 
called Mr. Calley a few days later and told him he had used his name in the bank 
robbery. (Tr., p.533, p.11 - p.534, L.1.) Mr. Calley offered to help Hawkins find 
an attorney, but Hawkins did not respond to Mr. Calley's offer and terminated the 
conversation shortly thereafter. (Tr., p.534, L.2 - p.535, L.lO.) 
Two months later, on August 10, 2006, law enforcement officials located 
Hawkins at a campground near The Dalles, Oregon. (Tr., p.649, Ls.3-11, p.652, 
Ls.2-19.) When an officer attempted to make contact with Hawkins at the camp 
trailer in which Hawkins was staying with his wife and children, Hawkins pointed 
a loaded gun at him. (Tr., p.918, L.17 - p.922, L.15.) The officer retreated and, 
after the campground was evacuated, officers from several different law 
enforcement agencies surrounded the trailer and ordered Hawkins to come out. 
(Tr., p.649, L.16 - p.653, L.5, p.923, L.17 - p.925, L.7.) An eight-hour standoff 
followed, during which Hawkins had several telephone conversations with 
George Calley, who attempted to convince Hawkins to release his wife and 
children to a female FBI agent at the scene. (Tr., p.535, L.15 - p.539, L.18, 
p.653, Ls.6-15, p.925, L . l l  - p.926, L.25.) Hawkins refused to do so and, with 
his wife and children still in the trailer, he fired a gunshot out of the trailer in the 
officers' direction. (Tr., p.927, L.l - p.932, L.18.) Hawkins eventually released 
his family to his parents in the early morning hours of August 11, 2006. (Tr., 
p.930, Ls.10-17.) About 20 minutes later, officers shot tear gas into the trailer, 
forcing Hawkins to come out. (Tr., p.654, Ls.2-24, p.931, Ls.1-7, p.934, L.21 - 
p.935, L.20.) Hawkins resisted arrest but was finally taken into custody and 
transported to a detention facility in The Dalles. (Tr., p.654, L.25 - p.655, L.17, 
p.672, Ls.1-12, p.674, Ls.9-14, p.935, L.21 -p.937, L.4.) 
Oregon State Police Detective Lori Rosebraugh interviewed Hawkins on 
theday of his arrest. (Tr., p.674, L.9-p.678, L.17, p.1037, L.9-p.1044, L.8.) 
At the outset of the interview Hawkins told the detective that he had been a CIA 
operative, had knowledge of or participated in the transportation of weapons to 
Canada, had been involved in a South American operation with a National 
Security advisor and, at some point, had cut a transponder out of his neck (Tr., 
p.1037, L.9 - p.1038, L.22); however, in a subsequent interview he admitted that 
he was not sure if everything he told the detective about his CIA involvement was 
true (Tr., p.1044, L.9 - p.1045, L.6). When asked about his living arrangements, 
Hawkins told the detective he had owned the camp trailer for a few days but that, 
for the past two years, he and his family had been living out of a van that was 
also parked at the campground. (Tr., p.676, L.23 - p.678, L.21.) He claimed to 
be a sophisticated criminal and explained that he had registered the van in the 
name of a fictitious corporation in order to avoid detection by law enforcement. 
(Tr., p.1038, L.23 - p.1040, L.lO.) He advised the detective that "Boise area law 
enforcement operates on open [radio] frequencies which are easy to scan," 
making Boise an attractive location commit bank robberies. (Tr., p.1040, L . l l  - 
p.1041, L.7.) He also freely admitted having robbed a Boise bank on December 
16th, noting "it was a 'gimme' because he had left his name at" the time of the 
robbery. (Tr.,p.1043,L.16-p.1044, L.8.) 
For the most part, Hawkins seemed calm and collected during his 
interviews with Detective Rosebraugh. (Tr., p.696, L.15 - p.697, L.21, p.740, 
L.13 - p.742, L.4.) He did become emotional when speaking about his children, 
but he otherwise appeared "fairly level-headed, [and] even." (Tr., p.696, L.19, 
P.697, L.21, p.742, Ls.5-20.) Detective Rosebraugh suggested to Hawkins that 
he consider seeing the jail therapist, but she did not believe Hawkins was 
suicidal, nor did she have any other specific concerns about his welfare. (Tr., 
p.697, L.22-p.698, L.8, p.1051, L.4-p.1054, L.5.) 
Following her first interview with Hawkins, Detective Rosebraugh obtained 
and executed a warrant to search Hawkins' van, pickup and camp trailer. (Tr., 
p.680, L.8 - p.680, L.25.) During the search officers found and seized several 
items matching the description of items Hawkins used during the Boise bank 
robberies. (Tr., p.681, L . l  - p.682, L.4, p.684, L.23 - p.688, L.22.) 
In the weeks and months following his arrest, Hawkins met with and was 
interviewed several times by FBI Agent Scott Mace. (Tr., p.1020, Ls.2-23, 
p.1057, Ls.8-13.).) During the interviews Hawkins said he was afraid of the 
people he worked for, and he expressed concern about the welfare of his wife 
and children. (Tr., p.1014, Ls.15-18, p.1061, Ls.17-25.) At one point he told 
Agent Mace that his wife, Darcy, and his son, Garrett, liked to spend money, and 
that Darcy encouraged Garrett to rob banks to get more money. (Tr., p.1058, 
L. 17 - p. 1060, 1.3.) He also said that he and Darcy had participated in Garrett's 
bank robberies by monitoring police scanners and that he had discussed with 
Garrett various methods of bank robbery, including using a demand note. (Tr., 
p.1060, Ls.4-24.) In subsequent interviews, however, Hawkins told Agent Mace 
that both he and Garrett had been forced to commit bank robberies wearing 
either a bomb vest or a "bomb collar." (Tr., p.1062, L.1 - p.1063, L.25.) Agent 
Mace eventually stopped meeting with Hawkins because his stories were 
inconsistent and, in Agent Mace's opinion, the information he provided "strained 
credibility" and had no investigative vaiue. (Tr., p.1063, L.17- p.1070, L.14.) 
Course of Proceedinqs 
A grand jury indicted Hawkins on two counts of robbery. (R., vol. I, pp.33- 
34.) At a hearing on February 9, 2007, Hawkins advised the district court that he 
wished to discharge his public defender and proceed pro se. (Supp. Tr., p.1, 
L.22 - p.2, L.17.) After an extensive ~ a r e t t a ~  inquiry, the district court granted 
Hawkins' request for self-representation but appointed the public defender as 
stand-by counsel. (Supp. Tr., p.3, L.2 - p.15, L.13.) Hawkins thereafter filed 
and argued numerous pretrial motions, including multiple discovery motions, 
motions for law library access, motions to suppress, and motions to vacate the 
trial. (R., vol. I, pp.49-55, 58-60, 67-70, 75-79.) The district court denied most of 
the motions but, at Hawkins' request twice vacated and reset the trial. (R., vol. I, 
pp.63-64, 80-81 .) 
On September 17, 2007, the day set for trial, Hawkins requested that 
counsel be reappointed to represent him and that the trial be vacated and reset 
for a later date. (R., vol. I, pp.96-97.) The district court granted Hawkins' motion 
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). 
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and set a new trial date of January 7, 2008. (R., vol. I, pp.96-98, 100; Tr., p.155, 
Ls.4-17.) A little over a month later, on October 26, 2007, Hawkins again moved 
to proceed pro se. (R., vol. I, p.101.) After conducting another Faretta inquiry, 
the district court granted the motion and again appointed the public defender as 
stand-by counsel. (R., vol. I, pp.102-03; Tr., p.158, L.4 - p.174, L.22.) Hawkins 
thereafter continued to file and argue pretrial motions, none of which were 
granted. (R., vol. I, pp.108-12, 122-27, 144.) 
At a hearing on January 2, 2008, the court quashed several of Hawkins' 
subpoenas (Tr., p.276, L . l l  - p.290, L.20) but, after an offer of proof, declined to 
quash the subpoenas of three potential defense witnesses whom Hawkins 
represented would provide testimony supporting a duress defense (Tr., p.290, 
L.21 - p.301, L.3). At the same hearing, the district court addressed Hawkins' 
complaints about his stand-by counsel, ultimately finding the allegations 
meritless and nothing more than a "continuing effort on the part of the defendant 
to prolong and delay" the trial. (Tr., p.309, L.4 - p.322, L.23.) 
When the trial finally commenced on January 7, 2008, Hawkins 
participated fully in the jury selection process (Tr., p.480, L.10 - p.490, L.21) 
and, with the assistance of stand-by counsel, cross-examined the state's 
witnesses (see generally, Tr., pp.542-550, 580-585, 626-629, 643-645, 660-665, 
689-709, 727-739, 749-751), argued against a motion in limine (see generally, 
Tr., pp.724-725, 756-761, 869-870, 873-877), made an opening statement (Tr., 
p.767, L.6 - p.776, L.9)' and called and examined defense witnesses (E 
qenerally, Tr., pp.777-847, 905-909, 961-987, 992-1024, 1029-1032). 
Hawkins testified on his own behalf. He admitted to having robbed the 
banks, but he claimed he did so under duress. (Tr., p.810, Ls.8-20, p.914, Ls.3- 
10, p.916, Ls.4-8.) Specifically, he testified that on December 16, 2005, a man 
named Robert Dugan contacted him and requested a meeting. (Tr., p.789, 
Ls.12-18.) According to Hawkins, Dugan and Nigel Winters were influential 
government operatives who had employed him to ship certain commodities, 
including "weapons-grade material" and radioactive waste, out of the United 
States in a manner so as to avoid FBI detection. (Tr., p.812, L.19 - p.814, L.4, 
p.821, L.18 - p.830, L.3.) Hawkins testified that, on December 16, 2005, Dugan 
and Winters were upset with him regarding the loss of a shipment. (Tr., p.789, 
L.12 - p.790, L . l l ,  p.798, Ls.17-22.) The men threatened Hawkins' wife and 
children. (Tr., p.792, Ls.10-15.) They also put a bomb vest on Hawkins and 
threatened to detonate it if he did not rob the Key Bank. (Tr., p.792, L.17 - 
p.795, L.3.) Hawkins testified that he robbed the bank and then turned the 
money over to the men. (Tr., p.795, L.3 - p.796, L.20.) 
Hawkins testified that Dugan and Winters contacted him again in June 
2006 and were again upset, this time because Hawkins had emailed his contact 
in Israel about the location of a "non-nuclear, nonhazardous explosive propellant" 
shipment. (Tr., p.798, L.17 - p.802, L.17.) The men placed another bomb vest 
on Hawkins and instructed him to "bring back precisely $15,000 as an interest 
payment for the shipment he lost. (Tr., p.803, Ls.6-71.) Hawkins did as he was 
instructed and robbed the Washington Mutual near Gowen Road. (Tr., p.805, 
L.20 - p.807, L.17.) 
Hawkins testified that he did not feel he had any choice but to rob the 
banks. (Tr., p.810, Ls.8-10.) He testified that he believed his life, as well as the 
lives of his wife and children, were all in danger. (Tr., p.810, Ls.11-20.) 
At the conclusion of the evidence, the district court instructed the jury on 
the elements of robbery and on the defense of duress. (Tr., p.1076, L.10 - 
p.1079, L.8.) During closing argument, the prosecutor asked the jury to reject 
Hawkins' duress defense, noting that Hawkins had given many inconsistent 
stories and, at one point, had even blamed his wife Darcy for encouraging the 
bank robberies. (Tr., p.1094, L.23 - p.1098, L.4.) Immediately following the 
state's argument, Hawkins said "Darcy never did nothing .... She never did 
nothing." (Tr., p.1098, Ls.10-15.) The district court asked Hawkins several times 
whether he wished to make a closing argument. (Tr., p.1098, L. I T  - p.1099, 
L.17.) Hawkins twice conferred with his stand-by counsel, who encouraged 
Hawkins to make a closing argument "to sum up his position regarding the 
duress defense." (Tr., p.1099, L.18 - p.llOO, L.l, p.1104, Ls.8-17.) When the 
court asked again whether Hawkins wished to make any closing remarks, 
Hawkins did not respond. (Tr., p.llOO, Ls.2-8.) 
After the jury retired to deliberate, Hawkins filed a "Motion to Address the 
Jury," seeking leave to present argument and claiming that he "was mentally not 
able to function properly." (Tr., p.1102, L.7-24.) The district court denied the 
motion, finding from the record before it and its own observations that Hawkins 
was not prevented by any mental condition from presenting argument to the jury 
at the allotted time. (Tr., p.1102, L.25 - p.1103, p.19.) 
Following deliberations, the jury found Hawkins guilty as charged. (Tr., 
p.1105, Ls.11-17.) Hawkins moved for the reappointment of counsel, and the 
district court granted his request. (Tr., p . l l lO ,  Ls.13-20.) A few minutes later, 
Hawkins' counsel advised the court that Hawkins was dissatisfied with counsel's 
performance because counsel did not believe there was any good faith basis to 
move either for a mistrial or for a new trial. (Tr., p.1114, L.12 - p.1115, L.12.) 
Hawkins requested that he be allowed to continue pro se to argue his motions. 
(Tr., p.1115, Ls.15-20.) The court noted that Hawkins had filed a motion to 
"dismiss on the grounds of mental incapacity," claiming that the state's evidence 
showed he was delusional. (Tr., p.1115, L.21 - p.116, L.17.) Based on 
Hawkins' claim, the court ordered an I.C. 3 19-2522 psychological evaluation for 
purposes of sentencing. (Tr., p.1117, L.7 - p.1118, L.2.) The court also 
declined Hawkins' request to proceed pro se, noting that "if Mr. Hawkins is 
contending that he is delusional, I don't think his decision whether to hire or not 
keep an attorney, at this point, is appropriate." (Tr., p.l't18, Ls.'lO-18.) 
At a hearing on January 31, 2008, the court set forth for the record its 
findings that it had never had cause to believe that Hawkins lacked the mental 
capacity to understand the proceedings or to assist in his own defense. (Tr., 
p.1120, L.15 - p.1121, L.1121, L.2.) The court explained that it had ordered an 
I.C. 3 19-2522 psychological evaluation "in an abundance of caution" based on 
the assertions made by Hawkins in his motion to dismiss, filed shortly after the 
jury had reached a verdict. (Tr., p.1121, Ls.3-14.) The court noted, however, 
that Hawkins had since failed to participate in the psychological evaluation and, 
after questioning Hawkins, the court determined that Hawkins was asserting his 
Fifth Amendment rights to not participate in such evaluation. (Tr., p.1121, L.15 - 
p.1125, L.25.) At Hawkins' request, the court ordered the public defender to 
continue to represent Hawkins and set the case over for a hearing on multiple 
post-trial motions that Hawkins had filed, pro se. (Tr., p.1126, L.l - p.1131, 
L. l l . )  
At the motions hearing on March 13, 2008, Hawkins' counsel advised 
Hawkins and the court that, if asked to argue Hawkins' post-trial motions, his 
position would be that the motions had no merit. (Tr., p.1144, Ls.1-25.) Based 
on counsel's representation, the court permitted Hawkins to argue his motions 
pro se, finding once again that Hawkins was competent to waive counsel and 
that he did so freely and voluntarily. (Tr., p.1139, L.13 - p.1143, L.20, p.1145, 
L.l - p.1147, L.16.) Following argument, the district court denied Hawkins' 
motions. (Tr., p.1163, L.6-p.1171, L.6.) 
The case proceeded to a sentencing hearing, at which Hawkins was 
represented by the public defender. (R., voi. 11, pp.270-71; Tr., p.1179, Ls.4-11.) 
The district court ultimately imposed concurrent unified sentences of life with 30 
years fixed. (R., vol. 11, pp.276-79; Tr., p.1210, Ls.17-20.) Hawkins timely 
appealed. (R., vol. 11, pp.286-88.) 
ISSUES 
Hawkins states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the failure to order a psychiatric evaluation and conduct 
a hearing to determine Mr. Hawkins' competence to stand trial 
violate his state and federal constitutional rights to due process as 
well as I.C. 33 18-210 and 18-21 I ?  [Citation omitted.] 
2. In the alternative, should this case be remanded for a 
determination of whether, given the Supreme Court decision in 
Indiana v. Edwards, - U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 2379 (2008), Mr. 
Hawkins was competent to waive his right to counsel? 
(Appellant's brief, p.17.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Hawkins failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion 
or violated Hawkins' due process rights by not sua sponfe ordering an evaluation 
of Hawkins' competency to stand trial? 
2. Has Hawkins failed to establish any basis for remand for a determination 
of Hawkins' competency to waive his right to counsel? 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
Hawkins Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Discretion 
Or Violated His Due Process Riahts By Not Sua Sponte Orderina An Evaluation 
To Determine His Competency To Stand Trial 
A. Introduction 
Hawkins argues that the district court erred by not sua sponte ordering a 
psychiatric evaluation to determine his competency to stand trial. (Appellant's 
brief, pp.18-22.) He contends there was evidence before the court that should 
have raised a genuine doubt about his competency and, as such, the failure to 
order an evaluation violated his due process rights and I.C. 99 18-210 and 18- 
211. (Id.) This argument fails. Hawkins did not request a competency 
evaluation and, contrary to his assertions, the record is devoid of any evidence 
that would have raised a bona find doubt about his mental capacity either to 
understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense, such 
that the district court would have been required to order a competency evaluation 
on its own motion. Hawkins has failed to establish an abuse of discretion or a 
violation of his due process rights. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The decision whether to order a psychological evaluation to determine a 
defendant's competence to stand trial is ordinarily reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion. State v. Lonaoria, 133 ldaho 819, 822, 992 P.2d 1219, 1222 (Ct. 
App. 1999); State v. Potter, 109 ldaho 967, 969, 712 P.2d 668, 670 (Ct. App. 
1985). The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues such 
as a claimed due process violation is one of deference to factual findings, unless 
they are clearly erroneous, but free review of whether constitutional requirements 
have been satisfied in light of the facts found. State v. Bromqard, 139 ldaho 
375, 380, 79 P.3d 734, 739 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Smith, 135 ldaho 712, 720, 
23 P.3d 786,794 (Ct. App. 2001). 
C. There Was Insufficient Evidence Before The Trial Court To Raise A Bona 
Fide Doubt About Hawkins' Competency To Stand Trial 
Due process prohibits the criminal prosecution of a defendant who is not 
mentally competent to stand trial. Indiana v. Edwards, - U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 
2379, 2383 (2008); Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171-72 (1975); Pate v. 
Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385 (1966); State v. Lovelace, 140 ldaho 53, 62, 90 
P.3d 278, 287 (2003). To safeguard this right, ldaho law requires a trial court to 
order a psychological evaluation when there is reason to doubt the defendant's 
competence to assist in his own defense or understand the proceedings. I.C. §§ 
18-210 and 18-211. 
A defendant's fitness to proceed to trial is determined by the trial judge, 
who has a "continuing duty to observe a defendant's ability to understand the 
proceedings against him." State v. Lonsoria, 133 ldaho 819, 822, 922 P.2d 
1219, 1222 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing State v. Potter, 109 ldaho 967, 969, 712 P.2d 
668, 670 (Ct. App. 1985)). See also I.C. 5 18-212. However, "[a] trial court has 
no duty to independently inquire as to the competency of a defendant unless the 
defendant raises the issue by motion or by presenting evidence showing lack of 
competency." State v. Hayes, 138 ldaho 761, 764, 69 P.3d 181, 184 (Ct. App. 
2003) (citing, e.g., State v. Fuchs, 100 ldaho 341, 346, 597 P.2d 227, 232 
(1979)). When the issue of competency has not been explicitly raised, the trial 
court must sua sponfe inquire as to the defendant's competency only if the 
evidence before it raises a good faith or bona fide doubt as to the competence of 
the defendant. Pate, 383 U.S. at 385; m, 100 ldaho at 346-47, 597 P.2d at 
232-33; Hayes, 138 ldaho at 764, 69 P.3d at 184. 
The test for determining a defendant's competence to stand trial is 
whether he "has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a 
reasonable degree of rational understanding and whether he has a rational, as 
well as factual, understanding of the proceedings against him." Lovelace, 140 
ldaho at 62, 90 P.3d at 287 (citing Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960). 
Accord I.C. § 18-210 (prohibiting the prosecution of any "person who as a result 
of mental disease or defect lacks capacity to understand the proceedings against 
him or to assist in his own defense"). Thus, to establish a due process violation, 
a defendant claiming for the first time on appeal that the trial court erred by not 
ordering a competency evaluation must show from the record as a whole that 
there existed substantial evidence sufficient to raise a genuine doubt concerning 
the defendant's ability to assist in his own defense and understand the nature of 
the proceedings. Bassett v. McCarthy, 549 F.2d 616, 619 (gth Cir. 1977) (citing 
Drope, 420 U.S. at 171). 
As noted by the Supreme Court, "There are ... no fixed or immutable 
signs which invariably indicate the need for further inquiry to determine fitness to 
proceed . . . . ' I  Drope, 420 U.S. at 180. "[Elvidence of a defendant's irrational 
behavior, his demeanor at trial, and any prior medical opinion on competence to 
stand trial are all relevant in determining whether further inquiry is required." Id. 
Other relevant factors include trial counsel's perceptions of the defendant's 
competence, the defendant's communications with the district court, and the 
defendant's ability to use legal terms appropriately. Hayes, 138 Idaho at 764-65, 
69 P.3d at 184-85; United States v. Landers, 564 F.3d 1217, 1221 (loth Cir. 
2009); Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 606 (gth Cir. 2004); United States v. 
Quintieri, 306 F.3d 1217, 1233 (2"* Cir. 2002); United States v. Lewis, 991 F.2d 
524, 528 (gth Cir. 1993). 
Hawkins never requested an I.C. Cj 18-211 competency evaluation. He 
nevertheless contends on appeal that the district court should have ordered one 
on its own motion based on the evidence before it. (Appellant's brief, pp.20-22.) 
Specifically, he argues that the district court should have entertained a genuine 
doubt about his competency to stand trial based on: his "act of giving his name 
along with George Calley's at the second robbery;" the "bizarre statements" he 
made during his interviews with law enforcement; his behavior during pretrial 
proceedings, including filing a motion seeking CIA and NSA files, filing a motion 
to vacate based on a claimed medical condition resulting from a head injury 
sustained while in jail, making reference to a "gag order" purportedly issued by 
an Oregon judge, and making claims regarding his need to subpoena certain 
witnesses who he claimed had sent Nigel Winters to threaten him; and his 
"unusual behavior and theory of the case before the jury." (Appellant's brief, 
pp.20-21.) Hawkins has failed to show any basis for reversal, however, because, 
while the examples he cites may reflect on his mental condition in general, they 
do not have any bearing on his capacity to understand the proceedings or assist 
in his defense. Bassett, 549 F.2d at 619 (citing Drope, 420 U.S. at 171) 
("The Court in Drope reminds us that this doubt relates not to mental illness in 
general but to the practical aspects of the defense of the action: I . . .  the capacity 
to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult 
with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense ..."'). Applying the correct 
legal standard to the evidence before the district court shows the court had no 
reason to doubt Hawkins' competency to stand trial. 
Hawkins consistently demonstrated throughout the pretrial and trial 
phases of the case that he understood the nature of the proceedings against him 
and was capable not only of assisting in his own defense, but in preparing and 
arguing his defense largely without the aid of counsel. Immediately after electing 
to proceed pro se, Hawkins requested discovery, moved for a court order 
permitting law library access and argued his own motion for bond reduction. 
(Supp. Tr., p.16, L.6 - p.30, L.25.) He thereafter filed and argued numerous 
pretrial motions, including several discovery motions and motions to vacate, a 
motion to exclude testimony, a motion to disqualify, a motion to suppress, and 
motions for law library access. (R., voi. I ,  pp.49-60, 63-64, 67-72, 75-83, 87-97, 
101-103, 108-1 14, 122-129, 141-144.) He was alert, responsive and courteous 
during court proceedings and, although lacking the skill of an attorney, generally 
used legal terms appropriately and displayed a general understanding of the 
workings of the criminal adversary system. (& qenerally, Supp. Tr. and Tr.) 
In addition to arguing his own pretrial motions, Hawkins also availed 
himself of the court's subpoena power to secure the attendance of witnesses at 
trial. (R., vol. I, pp.131-133.) Although the court ultimately quashed many of 
Hawkins' subpoenas pursuant to the state's motion, Hawkins did successfuliy 
argue against the quashing of subpoenas for three potential witnesses - Joseph 
Terteling, William Gordon and Steve Jordan - who Hawkins claimed would 
support his duress defense. (Tr., p.278, L.3 - p.301, L.2.) Ultimately, many of 
Hawkins' out-of-state witnesses, including Terteling, Gordon and Jordan, did not 
appear at trial due to what appeared to be a lack of proper service of their 
subpoenas. (Tr., p.1033, L.3 - p.1036, L.1.) However, there is no indication in 
the record that Hawkins' failure to properly serve the out-of-state subpoenas 
resulted from a lack of mental capacity, as opposed to merely being due to 
Hawkins' status as a pro se defendant and his lack of familiarity with the law. 
It appears from the record that Hawkins also had the mental wherewithal 
to use his lack of formal legal training to his advantage prior to trial. He 
successfully garnered three postponements of the trial date, twice because he 
demonstrated to the court's satisfaction he needed more time to review 
discovery and conduct legal research (Tr., p.54, L.7 - p.56, L.22, p.70, L.18 - 
p.72, L.19), and once because he requested that counsel be reappointed to 
represent him at trial (R., vol. I, pp.96-97; Tr., p.157, Ls.9-13). When he 
complained about his counsel's representation and moved for a fourth 
continuance, after again electing to proceed pro se, the court found that it had 
been Hawkins' "objective" throughout the proceedings to "prolong and delay a 
trial." (Tr., p.321, L.17 - p.322, L.23.) Far from raising doubt about Hawkins' 
competence to stand trial, Hawkins' attempts to manipulate the course of the 
proceedings to his own advantage actual demonstrate his ability to understand 
the proceedings and assist in his own defense. 
There was also no basis for the court to have entertained a good faith 
doubt about Hawkins' competency based on his conduct at trial. Proceeding pro 
se, Hawkins actively participated in all phases of the trial, from jury selection to 
the reading of the verdict. (See qenerally, Tr., pp.351-1105.) He cross- 
examined and was courteous to the state's witnesses, gave his own opening 
statement and questioned defense witnesses, including himself, about topics 
relevant to his claim of duress. (See generally, Tr., pp.542-1032.) Although the 
"facts" on which Hawkins based his duress defense certainly strained credibility 
and possibly even indicated a level of delusional thinking relating to the 
commission of the bank robberies and the reasons therefor, nothing about 
Hawkins' belief that he was justified in committing the robberies cast doubt on his 
ability to understand the proceedings or present a defense. In presenting 
evidence and arguing that he committed the robberies under duress, Hawkins 
advanced a cognizable legal defense with sufficient ability to persuade the 
district court that the giving of instructions on the defense was appropriate. (See 
Tr., p.1078, L.7 - p.1079, L.8.) That the jury ultimately rejected the defense was 
not sufficient by itself, give rise to a bona fide doubt about Hawkins' competence. 
If it were, trial courts would be required to order competency evaluations for 
every defendant who raised a cognizable, but unbelievable, defense. 
That the district court had no reason to entertain a good faith doubt about 
Hawkins' fitness to stand trial is also demonstrated by the absence of direct 
evidence indicating a lack of competency. Although Hawkins elected to proceed 
pro se throughout the trial and through most of the pretrial proceedings, stand-by 
counsel was always present and often conferred with Hawkins at Hawkins' 
request. (Tr., p.237, Ls.15-17, p.550, Ls.5-6, p.657, Ls.19-21, p.664, Ls.18-24, 
p.724, Ls.4-7, p.754, Ls.20-25, p.762, Ls.13-24, p.945, Ls.1-17, p.985, L.23 - 
p.986, L.2, p.1013, L.24- p.1014, L.3, p.1016, Ls.9-11, p.1039, Ls.5-10, p.1074, 
Ls.1-8, p.1099, L.18 - p.llOO, L.1.) It is clear from the record that Hawkins and 
his stand-by counsel did not always agree about trial strategy and, because of 
that, counsel spoke extensively to the court on the record about his 
communications with Hawkins. (Tr., p.160, L.10 - p.162, L.21, p.850, L.5 - 
p.855, L.16, p.858, L.18 - p.867, L.2.) However, at no time during his 
communications with the court, ehher before or during trial, did counsel ever 
indicate or express concern regarding Hawkins' fitness to proceed. In fact, the 
closest stand-by counsel ever came during trial to questioning Hawkins' 
competency was his statement to the district court, during a recess taken during 
the defense case-in-chief, that Hawkins "has the ability to spin a yarn." (Tr., 
p.854, Ls.14-16.) Thus, while it appears that stand-by counsel believed Hawkins 
had a vivid imagination, there is simply no indication in the record that counsel 
believed Hawkins lacked the competency to proceed or that he communicated 
such a belief to the court. Although not dispositive, counsel's failure to indicate a 
lack of competency weighs heavily in favor of a finding that the evidence before 
the district court was not sufficient to raise a bona fide doubt about Hawkins' 
ability to assist in his own defense or understand the proceedings. See Drope, 
420 U.S. at 177 n. 13 (recognizing the importance of considering counsel's 
judgment about the defendant's state of mind); Quintieri, 306 F.3d at 1233 
("[Qhile a defendant may be found incompetent even when his attorney asserts 
that he is competent, ... [a] failure by trial counsel to indicate that the defendant 
had any difficulty assisting in preparation or in comprehending the nature of the 
proceedings provides substantial evidence of the defendant's competence.") 
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted), 
The first time Hawkins or his stand-by counsel even hinted that Hawkins 
might be incompetent was in a "Motion to Address the Jury," filed by Hawkins 
after the jury retired to deliberate. (R., vol. I, p.194; Tr., p.1102, Ls.7-24.) 
Hawkins claimed in the motion that he "was mentally not able to function 
properly" during closing argument. (Id.) The district court denied the motion, 
finding from its own observations of Hawkins' demeanor and conduct that, at all 
times relevant to the trial, Hawkins appeared fit to proceed. (Tr., p.11-2, L.25 - 
p.1103, L.19.) The court explained: 
The motion is denied. The jury - first of all, when we had 
reached the point where the evidentiary portion of the trial had 
come to a close, we had a jury instructions conference. Both sides 
said they were ready to proceed. The court will note that Mr. 
Hawkins has been fully functional and focused and alert. In fact, 
his testimony before this jury on direct examination was clear, 
concise, and - I'm certainly not here to say whether he was reading 
from a script or not, but it did not appear to be that. It appears that 
he had much of it clearly in his mind. 
... [Alnd secondly, there is a point in time where the jury 
receives the evidence. We don't have them come back in. You 
were afforded approximately five to seven minutes to speak to the 
jury after multiple requests. I can't find from the record or my 
observations of you that you were disoriented at the time or 
suffering from any mental disorder that appeared obvious, at least 
to a lay person such as myself. And so, the motion is denied. 
(Tr., p.1102, L.25-p.1103, L.19.) 
Shortly after the jury reached its verdict finding Hawkins guilty of two 
counts of robbery Hawkins again claimed mental incompetence and moved to 
dismiss the case. (R., vol. I, p.195; Tr., p.1115, L.21 - p.1116, L.21.) The court 
declined to dismiss the case but ordered an I.C. § 19-2522 psychological 
evaluation for purposes of sentencing. (R., vol. I, pp.198-199; Tr., p.1117, L.7 - 
p.1118, L.2.) After doing so, the court explicitly noted for the record its additional 
findings regarding its perceptions of Hawkins' competency to stand trial: 
The court - based upon an abundance of caution and, in . - 
part, based on the defendant's request - ordered a psychological 
evaluation under 19-2522. And for the record, the court has never 
had a 18-210 or 18-211 request in this case. And this court - 
throughout the course of these proceedings and Mr. Hawkins' 
representation of himself over many months - certainly has no 
reason to believe that Mr. Hawkins has a mentai disease or defect 
that causes him to lack the capacity to understand the proceedings 
against him or to assist in his own defense. And that's really the 
purpose of 18-211. And certainly, nothing has come to light that 
indicated that that was the case. 
(Tr., p.1120, L.15 - p.1121, L.2.) The court further noted that Hawkins had failed 
to participate in the I.C. § 19-2522 evaluation and determined, after questioning 
Hawkins, that Hawkins was asserting his Fifth Amendment rights to not 
participate in such an evaluation. (Tr., p.1121, 1.1 5 - p.1125, L.25.) Referring 
to Hawkins' post-trial motions to strike the verdict and for a new trial, the court 
found in the same hearing that the motions were "well articulated," giving the 
court further reason to believe that Hawkins was "fully capable and competent to 
proceed," that he understood the scope of the proceedings, and the he had filed 
"what would be considered to be very appropriate post-trial motions." (Tr., 
p.1126, Ls.1-17.) 
The district court's observations and perceptions of Hawkins' competency 
are supported by the record as a whole and, as such, are entitled to deference 
P-ate, 383 U.S. at 386; Quintieri, 306 F.3d at 1233; United States v. Vamos, 797 
F.2d 1146, 1150 2"d Cir.1986) ("[Dleference is owed to the district court's 
determinations based on observation of the defendant during the proceedings."). 
Hawkins did not assert he lacked the capacity to understand the proceedings or 
assist in his defense until late in the proceedings, when he was facing the jury's 
verdict. Even after he claimed incompetence he failed to participate in a 
psychological evaluation. He undoubtedly had the right to do so. See Estrada v. 
State, 143 Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 833 (2006). However, because he exercised his 
right to not participate in the evaluation there was no medical evidence in the 
record to corroborate Hawkins' claim of incompetence and, thus, no medical 
evidence to rebut the district court's determination that nothing in the record 
before it called Hawkins' competency into doubt. 
In light of the record as a whole - including Hawkins' behavior and 
demeanor before and during trial, the lack of any indication by stand-by counsel 
that Hawkins was not competent to stand trial, the trial court's own observations, 
and the absence of any medical or other evidence reflecting a lack of 
competency - a reasonable judge would not have been expected to entertain a 
genuine doubt about Hawkins' ability to understand the proceedings or assist in 
his own defense. Hawkins has therefore failed to show that the district court 
abused its discretion or violated his due process rights by not ordering an I.C. Cj 
18-21 1 competency evaluation. 
II. 
Hawkins Has Failed To Establish Any Basis For Remand For A Determination Of 
His Com~etency To Waive His Riaht To Counsel 
Hawkins argues that, even if the district court did not err in failing to sua 
sponfe order an evaluation of his competency to stand trial, he is nevertheless 
entitled to remand for a determination of his competency to waive his right to 
counsel and proceed pro se. (Appellant's brief, pp.22-25.) In support of his 
position, Hawkins relies on Indiana v. Edwards, - U.S. , 128 S.Ct. 2379, 
2385 (2008), which held that the question of mental competence for self- 
representation "calls for a different standard" than the question of mental 
competence to stand trial. Hawkins asserts that, under Edwards, "the standard 
for measuring competency to waive counsel is whether the defendant is able 'to 
carry out the basic tasks needed to present his own case without the help of 
counsel"' (Appellant's brief, p.23 (quoting Edwards, - U.S. at -, 128 S.Ct. at 
2386)) and, he contends, remand is required because the district court did not 
apply this standard in its decisions to permit Hawkins to proceed pro se 
(Appellant's brief, pp.24-25). 
Hawkins' argument fails on its premises. First, contrary to Hawkins' 
assertion, the Court in Edwards specifically declined to adopt a specific standard 
for competency to waive counsel, leaving the determination instead to trial 
judges who "will often prove best able to make more fine-tuned mental capacity 
decisions, tailored to the individualized circumstances of a particular defendant." 
Edwards, - U.S. at , 128 S.Ct. at 2387-88. See also United States v. 
Ferauson, 560 F.3d 1060, 1067-68 (gth Cir. 2009). Second, although the district 
court did not have the benefit of Edwards in deciding whether to permit Hawkins 
to represent himself, remand is not required because a review of the record 
shows not only that the district court considered Hawkins' mental competency to 
waive counsel, but also that Hawkins was actually competent to conduct his own 
defense under the Edwards standard. 
As succinctly summarized by the court in Ferauson, supra, the Supreme 
Court's determination in Edwards that the waiver of the right to counsel requires 
a higher competency standard than that to stand trial "was driven by '[sleveral 
considerations."' Ferauson, 560 F.3d at 1068 (quoting Edwards, - U.S. at 
____, 128 S.Ct. at 2386). 
First, the Court found that its precedents "slightly" favored a 
different standard. Id. Second, the Court recognized that "[mlental 
illness itself is not a unitary concept .... In certain instances an 
individual ... will be able to work with counsel at trial, yet at the 
same time he may be unable to carry out the basic tasks needed to 
~resent  his own defense without the helr, of counsel." Id. Third. 
"insofar as a defendant's lack of capacity threatens an imprope; 
conviction or sentence, self-representation in the exceptional 
context undercuts the most basic of the Constitution's criminal law 
objectives, providing a fair trial." Id. at 2387. "Further, proceedings 
must not only be fair, they must 'appear fair to all who observe 
them."' Id. (quoting Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 160, 
108 S.Ct. 1692, 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988)). 
Applying the considerations in this case, there can be no question that 
Hawkins was not prevented by any mental disease or defect from competently 
representing himself and receiving a fair trial. Even without the benefit of 
Edwards, the district court specifically inquired during the various Faretta 
hearings regarding Hawkins' mental condition, and on each occasion Hawkins 
assured the court that he had never been diagnosed or treated for any sort of 
mental illness andlor was not taking any mediation to treat a mental illness. 
(Supp. Tr., p.13, Ls.16-19; Tr., p.1140, Ls.2-17.) Further, this is not a case, like 
Ferauson, supra, where the appellate court is left to divine whether the Supreme 
Court's decision in Edwards would have affected the district court's decision to 
permit Hawkins to proceed pro se. To the contrary, the district court addressed 
the issue of Hawkins' mental capacity on numerous occasions and determined, 
based upon the evidence before it, that Hawkins possessed the mental acuity 
not only to understand the proceedings but also to conduct his own defense. 
(Tr., p.1120, L.15 - p.1121, L.2, p.1126, Ls.1-17, p.1141, L.23 - p.1142, L.lO, 
p.1147, Ls.8-16.) As set forth in Section I.C. above, the trial court's 
determinations are supported b y  the record which shows that Hawkins filed 
numerous pretrial and post-trial motions, actively participated at trial, and 
presented a legally cognizable, albeit factually implausible, defense. Finally, 
Hawkins was not unaided by counsel. The court appointed stand-by counsel to 
assist Hawkins, and Hawkins conferred extensively with counsel during both the 
pretrial and trial proceedings. (Tr., p.1168, Ls.10-24.) 
The record affirmatively shows that Hawkins was capable of carrying out 
the basic tasks necessary to conduct his own defense. Having exhibited the 
ability to competently represent himself at trial, Hawkins has failed to show any 
basis for remand in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Edwards. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment of 
conviction entered upon the jury verdict finding Hawkins guilty of two counts of 
robbery. 
DATED this 27'h day of July 2009. 
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